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Abstract
Kenya’s Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is one of the ingenious inno-
vations of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Government of Kenya. Unlike
other development funds that filter from the central government through larger and
more layers of administrative organs and bureaucracies, funds under this program
go directly to local levels and thus provide people at the grassroots the opportu-
nity to make expenditure decisions that maximize their welfare consistent with
the theoretical predictions of decentralization theory. Increasingly, however, con-
cerns about the utilization of funds under this program are emerging. Most of the
concerns revolve around issues of allocative efficiency. In this note, I highlight
some of the constituency characteristics that impact on the efficiency and efficacy
of CDF and also some political economy aspects associated with this program. In
particular it is observed that CDF could have negative outcomes because of fiscal
illusion and reduced local fiscal effort. The paper recommends an in-depth analy-
sis of constituency characteristics that impact on the utilization of funds to ensure
that the program achieves its full potential.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D21, D70, H60
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1 Introduction
The Constituency Development Fund (CDF), which was established through the
Constituency Development Fund Act of 2003, is one of the ingenious innovations
of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Government of Kenya.1 CDF is an
annual budgetary allocation by the Central Government to each of the country’s
parliamentary jurisdictions-the constituencies. While there are several rules that
govern the utilization of the Fund to ensure transparency and accountability,
decisions over the utilization of the funds are primarily by the constituents.2
Unlike other development funds that filter from the central government through
larger and more layers of administrative organs and bureaucracies, the funds
under this program go directly to local levels. In essence, the CDF provides
individuals at the grassroots the opportunity to make expenditure choices that
maximize their welfare in line with their needs and preferences. To the extent
that the local population is better informed about their priorities, the choices
made can be expected to be more aligned to their problems and circumstances.
The CDF can therefore be considered a decentralization scheme that provides
communities with the opportunity to make spending decisions that maximize
social welfare. The CDF is an example of what is generally referred to as Com-
munity Driven Development (CDD) initiatives that empower local communities
by providing fungible funds (often from the central government but some times
from donor sources).
Although the CDF takes a relatively small amount of national resources-
2.5 percent of government’s ordinary revenue collected every year, its impact
can be significant if the funds are efficiently utilized. Because the Fund benefit
communities directly, it stimulates local involvement in development projects
and as a result constituents have more information about projects funded under
this program. This is evidenced by regular commentaries in the media and
reports by members of parliament on the status of the CDF projects. As a result
of the involvement of communities in decision making and monitoring resource
use, theory predicts that programs such as CDF would result in high levels of
efficiency and that the selection of the projects would vary across jurisdictions
in line with development priorities. These efficiency outcomes largely arise from
the role that communities play in decision making and monitoring the use of
funds.
But constituencies are not created equal. Constituencies vary widely in var-
ious aspects that may impact on the efficiency of CDF. Some of these aspects
include size of the jurisdictions, population size, density and diversity, scope
of economic activities, degree of urbanization, levels of education, poverty, etc.
These dimensions are expected to impact on the project choices and the extent
1There are several countries that have had similar initiatives for some time now. Good
examples include the India’s Members of Parliament Constituency Development Fund and
Solomon Island’s Rural Constituency Development Fund.
2Funding per constituency is fairly uniform but some allowance is made for poverty levels
so that higher poverty areas receive slightly more resources. There are also some restriction
such as limits on the share of funds that go to a particular type of project.
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to which local communities are involved in decision making and in monitor-
ing expenditures. In essence, constituencies provide a natural laboratory to
test functional theories of community driven development and decentralization.
Simply, we should expect to observe systematic differences in the utilization of
CDF across constituencies depending on factors influencing citizen demand and
characteristics of the constituencies.3
There are indications that CDF is helping provide services to communities
that for many years did not benefit substantially from government services. In
particular, the poor have in the past experienced serious problems accessing
basic services that are now made available through CDF. Nevertheless, there
are increasing concerns about the utilization of CDF which suggest that the
funds are not being utilized optimally. Given the importance of this program,
an in-depth analysis of both institutional, design and implementation factors
that impact on the efficiency of the use of funds is necessary. At this early
stage in the implementation of CDF, it is strongly recommended that an in-
depth objective analysis of CDF be undertaken with a view to unearthing the
potential sources of weaknesses. This concept note outlines a framework for
analyzing the efficiency and efficacy of the Constituency Development Fund.
2 Citizen Demand and Constituency Character-
istics
Recent efforts to national planning in Kenya have sought to identify devel-
opment priorities through consultations. For example, the preparation of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) involved broad stakeholder consul-
tations across the entire country with the objective of eliciting information on
key concerns and priorities. Likewise, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Em-
ployment and Wealth Creation took into account the priorities as expressed
by stakeholders though the consultations were not as broad and intensive as
those carried out in the preparation of the PRSP. These consultations have
been particularly insightful in highlighting the priority rankings of development
needs by communities. One of the important lessons learned from the various
consultations conducted in Kenya is that while the country faces a number of
cross-cutting problems that Kenyans consider as important, there are significant
differences in the way communities rank their priorities. Efficiency in resource
allocation then would suggest that the government budget should be tailored to
meet diverse priorities in the different areas. To some degree, Kenya’s national
budget is informed by the priorities arising from the consultations. Neverthe-
less, the nature of central government budget allocation is not suited to dealing
with very specific priority rankings by local communities but must necessarily
be broader in focus. A national budget is not an efficient tool to match local
3A comprehensive analysis of the theoretical issues to be investigated are discussed in
Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Patrick Meagher (2004), Devolution and Development, Ashgate Pub-
lishers, UK.
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prioritization because the transaction costs of implementing such an allocation
scheme would be extremely high.
Given the diversity of expressed demands for particular public goods, project
choices under CDF are expected to vary across constituencies as communities
prioritize those projects that have the highest marginal impact on their lives
within the budgetary constraints. Citizens are able to align their demands
with resource allocation. Thus, there should be significant variations in project
choices across political jurisdictions and a strong correlation between the se-
lected projects in each constituency and the priorities expressed by the various
communities through consultations. We can therefore develop an efficiency mea-
sure based on how close the CDF projects reflect expressed priorities. Such a
measure would help identify whether CDF is generally associated with social
welfare enhancing outcomes as predicted by decentralization theory.4
There are, however, wide variations in the constituency characteristics that
may impact on the choice of the projects and mode of delivery and which may
enhance or impede on the efficiency of utilization of CDF. Efficiency is primar-
ily determined by the degree of involvement by local communities and also the
capacity for the beneficiaries to hold politicians and those in charge of imple-
mentation accountable. Thus, constituency characteristics that impact on these
factors can be expected to affect the utilization of funds. Constituency charac-
teristics that hinder participation of the beneficiaries or weaken their capacity
to monitor the utilization of funds can be expected to lead to more inefficient
outcomes. Simply, we expect to find wider divergences in the projects selected
compared to expressed priorities the weaker the participation of the communi-
ties in decision making.5 There are several factors that may impact on CDF
outcomes as discussed below:6
2.1 Size of Constituencies/Population Density and Dis-
persion
Constituencies differ with respect to the size of the land mass, population and
population density. All these characteristics are expected to influence the choice
of projects and the mode of delivery. Some projects that could serve a large
number of people in high density areas may not be optimal where population is
4Wemake an assumption that prioritization resulting from the consultations reflect truthful
revelation of preferences. This is a valid assumption because in soliciting the information on
priorities, citizens were not expected to link the priorities to tax shares and thus there is no
reason to distort preferences to avoid higher tax burden. However, the fact that there are no
prices attached to the priorities can distort the scope of priorities.
5Participation is considered effective not by mere attendance to meetings but rather the
ability to voice views and question decisions.
6Some preliminary analysis of data available on CDF expenditures across the constituencies
for the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 fiscal years seem to provide support of standard theories of
decentralization. The data used are from the Ministry of Finance, Government of Kenya as
reported in the CDF website (www.cdf.go.ke). Key information necessary for comprehensive
analysis is missing and thus the analysis should be considered tentative. See Mwangi S.
Kimenyi,”How Well Do Projects Under Kenya’s CDF Reflect Revealed Priorities?” January
2005.
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widely dispersed. The result of such differences may be reflected in the scale of
projects (few large dispensaries versus many few clinics). Likewise, while a day
secondary school could serve a large number of people in dense areas, such may
not be ideal for low density areas where investing in a boarding school would
be more ideal. Even though different communities prioritize provision of water,
the mode of service delivery is expected to vary depending on the constituency
characteristics in regard to population distribution. By developing measures of
the characteristics of the population served by a particular CDF project, it is
possible to identify the extent to which the constituency characteristics influence
the project choices.
2.2 Strategic Choice of Projects to Internalize Benefits
An important aspect of project choices under CDF concerns the internalization
of benefits. From a theoretical standpoint, one would expect that choice of
projects is motivated by making sure that benefits are internalized by members
of the constituency as much as possible. In short, we expect that CDF projects
will be more of the ”club goods” type as opposed to broad public goods. Simply,
there are projects that would have widespread spillover benefits to communities
in other constituencies. While such projects may have been ranked high amongst
the priorities, they may not be selected because of the spillover benefits (eg. a
road that passes through a number of constituencies).
In urban centers where students from different constituencies can attend a
particular primary school, there may be a tendency to avoid investing in school
improvements because such would essentially export the benefits to other con-
stituencies. Thus, there may be a tendency to invest in projects whose benefits
accrue generally to the residents-e.g. public toilets, walkways, improvements
in service delivery such as water, local security, etc. Simply, project choices
may reflect avoidance of benefit exportation rather than the expressed priori-
ties. A primary activity that should be undertaken then is to establish rigorous
measures of the extent to which different projects internalize benefits.7
2.3 Diversity of Preferences/Socio-Economic Characteris-
tics
The theory of decentralization teaches that the heterogeneity of preferences is
a key determinant of the efficiency of the public goods provision. The utiliza-
tion of CDF is also expected to be influenced by the degree of diversity. There
are many parameters that capture the heterogeneity of a community including
income, economic activities, education, etc. Diversity is expected to influence
scope of project choices. In homogeneous communities, projects could be few
but much larger in scope. Community involvement is also much higher in more
7There is a likelihood that communities select projects that export costs to others–that
is activities that have negative consequences to residents of other constituencies.This is an
interesting issue that should also be looked into.
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homogeneous communities, other things equal. On the other hand, more het-
erogenous communities are likely to select many diverse projets to cater for
the diversity of preferences. Measures of population heterogeneity are therefore
necessary in order to capture variations in the characteristics of population that
may impact project choices across constituencies.
Social-economic characteristics of a constituency have a bearing on commu-
nity participation. A key factor are those factors that impact on social capital.
The average level of education in a constituency is expected to influence the
involvement of the community and also the extent to which they are able to
monitor the utilization of funds. We expect that CDF projects will be more
in line with priorities in areas where the average level of education is higher.8
Likewise, religion may also influence the choice of projects and cohesiveness of
a community.
2.4 Interest Groups
The interest-group theory of government suggests that well organized producer
and consumer interests often influence the spending choices of government. We
expect that CDF is also subject to interest group competition and that resources
are likley to benefit well organized interest groups. It is therefore important
that an evaluation of CDF involve an investigation of the extent to which the
projects reflect the competition amongst local interests. This will require a
detailed understanding of the various groups that are well organized and are
capable of capturing rents arising from the CDF. Of particular relevance is an
understanding of the role of various NGO’s in the selection of projects.
3 Political Economy of CDF
There are some political dimensions that arise from the nature and management
of CDF. 9 We have noted that CDF is a form of decentralization. However, un-
like in pure fiscal decentralization which is characterized by both revenues and
expenditures, CDF is a one sided fiscal decentralization scheme since expendi-
ture are not linked to the local revenue sources or fiscal effort. Such partial
decentralization can associate with fiscal illusion which minimizes the extent
to which beneficiaries monitor use of funds. Simply, beneficiaries consider the
funds as ”free” and thus are not motivated to monitor utilization of funds since
they do not take into account the costs of the projects. It is therefore impor-
tant to investigate the monitoring aspects associated with CDF and the degree
to which constituency characteristics may influence fiscal illusion and therefore
inefficiencies.
8However, presence of elite groups could capture the program so that project serve much
narrower interests.
9A byproduct of CDF is that it may increase the advantages of incumbency. Other things
equal, we can expect lower turnovers in parliamentary elections than has been the case before
and this advantage could filter to other elective offices. We do not focus on this aspect of
CDF though it may merit analysis from a public choice perspective.
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CDF also has some direct political implications. Political leaders may view
CDF as an investment in their political careers with returns spread over the
electrol cycles. Simply, a politician would prefer projects that maximize political
returns while voters would prefer projects that maximize welfare. These two
objectives may be in concert but there are many cases where the constituency
characteristics might result in divergence such that political maximization is not
equivalent to welfare maximization. To the extent that members of Parliament
have a key role in the identification and implementation of the projects, we do
expect choices to be influenced by political maximization. 10
Finally, there is a possibility that CDF could suppress local fiscal effort
which has hitherto been through voluntary contributions for community devel-
opment. Such displacement effect could be counterproductive and may actually
weaken participation. Ideally, CDF should not discourage local mobilization of
development resources but should instead be complementary. In evaluating the
efficiency and efficacy of CDF, it is necessary to investigate the extent to which
the funds are complementing or substituting local resource mobilization.
4 Conclusion
There is no doubt that CDF is a novel concept and one that is expected to
have major positive impact on development at the grassroots. In addition to
advancing the welfare of the people through community projects, CDF has a
salutary effect on participation which is itself pivotal to empowerment of com-
munities. Because of the apparent positive evaluation by beneficiaries of CDF,
there is high probability that other developing countries will seek to emulate the
Kenyan concept. There are indications that a number of countries in the region
are intend to study the Kenyan model with the hope that they can legislate
similar prgrams. As such, understanding the operations of CDF, particularly
the aspects that impact on efficiency, is crucial. It is therefore recommended
that a rigorous study to identify the main sources of concerns that are emerging
be undertaken so as to avert major failures in the future. Such a study would
offer concrete recommendations on reforms and also the type of information
and data that should be required of all CDF projects for effective monitoring
and evaluation. Finally, a better understanding of CDF can provide important
information that should help in design of other decentralization schemes that
may be implemented should the proposed constitution be adopted.11
10Members of Parliament influence project choices through their role in the selection of
management committee members.
11The draft constitution proposes a devolved structure of government with the District as
the lower unit of government.
